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Abstract. Individualized services are common in distributed computing systems: Consumers demand custom solutions and service providers tailor their offering. In negotiating a service contract, providers and consumers frequently
fail in identifying the optimal combination of non-functional properties and
price. A key reason is that negotiators simultaneously try to create and claim
value leading to strategic bidding and inefficient outcomes.
We present a theoretical comparison of three negotiation mechanisms in the
scenario of self-interested, rational agents bilaterally negotiating over service
quality and price. Two mechanisms are stylized representations of mechanisms
commonly used in theory and practice, one is newly introduced. The mechanisms are characterized in terms of truthfulness of agents, efficiency of outcomes, and distribution of welfare.
The analysis is an extension to the field of bilateral multi-attribute negotiations,
relevant for researchers and practitioners designing markets for individualized
IT services and for human and computer agents acting in such markets.
Keywords: Consumerization, Service Quality, Service Management, Negotiation Strategy, Automated Negotiation

1

Introduction

Today, consumerization of products and services is well-set in almost any domain.
For services, individual and close interaction between consumer and provider happens
almost by definition. With technological progress and rising customer expectations,
off-the-shelf offerings to fit the greatest common denominator of consumer demands
go out of date in favor of individualized solutions. In this trend, quality marks the
center of attention besides price and functional requirements. This is especially the
case for IT-based services, with Cloud services being in the focus of current attention.
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1.1

Individualized Quality-Differentiated Services

There are different types of Cloud services available, forming a continuum from very
small atomic services that serve a very distinct purpose to very large services, built
manually and on demand for important consumers. Atomic services are highly standardized and typically address the volume business segment, trying to sell the same
service to as many customers as possible while keeping transaction costs at a minimum. An example for such a very small service is WhatsApp, a messaging service for
smartphone users. It is offered in a single quality for a fixed price. Very large services
on the other hand are situated in the value business segment, trying to meet the very
individual needs of substantial consumers. Examples include IT outsourcing by IBM,
SAP and others.
In this work, we focus on medium sized service offers in the middle of the aforementioned continuum. With Dropbox and Amazon Web Services as examples, these
services are characterized by a set of different service levels. They try to compromise
value and volume business by advertising different versions and qualities of the same
basic functionality. With increasing number of versions, services are provided in a
mass customization manner, which becomes very profitable if transaction costs can be
effectively reduced by automation. 1&1 Dynamic Cloud Server, for example, offers
almost a continuum of different service configurations for consumers to choose from
through a simple Web interface.1 In this example, the configurations are rather close
to technical specifications, the extension to Service Level Agreements (SLAs) is,
however, straightforward.
In the trend of an increasing demand for short-lived and ad hoc outsourcing, it becomes even more important to reduce transaction costs through automating the
agreement process for customized services. The agreement on quality attributes of a
customized service is neither black nor white: The consumer may have an optimal
service offer in mind which would perfectly fulfill her needs along multiple quality
dimensions, paired with a maximum willingness to pay. Offerings that yield slightly
lower quality may still be good enough, yet come along with a decreased willingness
to pay. In the following we assume that the consumer’s preferences over quality attributes can be expressed in a scoring rule or function [1-3].
1.2

Negotiation of Service Agreements

It has long been postulated that the wide-spread, fine-grained use of IT services in
cross-organizational environments requires low transaction costs in negotiating service agreements [4]. This implies multiple challenges: Negotiating parties need to
have a common understanding of the negotiation object, e.g., via a domain ontology.
Parties need a negotiation mechanism to follow in their negotiation and, finally, each
party needs a decision making model to automate its internal decision making. See [46] for early approaches to these challenges. Over the last years, economic mecha-
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nisms for service negotiation and management became more prominent; see [7] for a
recent survey.
In this paper, we address the challenge of selecting a negotiation mechanism, by
proposing and comparing three mechanisms. Multiple mechanisms need to be designed and deployed as consumers and providers have different goals, objectives,
strategies, and requirements [7]. A multi-dimensional negotiation between consumer
and provider typically includes an integrative and a distributive element. The integrative element shall identify the optimal service level that maximizes the difference
from consumer utility and provider costs. In other words and when expressing consumer utility in monetary terms, it specifies the economic surplus created in the negotiation. The distributive element determines how the economic surplus is actually
distributed between the negotiating parties. Thus, in this part, the market participants
claim their stake in the value created by the agreement. Negotiators acting strategically typically address integrative and distributive elements in parallel. They thereby
limit their own ability to mutually maximize the economic surplus.
A negotiation mechanism or, more general, a market mechanism is typically
judged with respect to four desirable economic characteristics: individual rationality,
incentive compatibility, (ex-post) allocation efficiency, and budget balance [8]. The
economic outcome of such a setting is restricted by a multitude of strong theoretic
results: Given quasi-linear preferences, it is impossible to design a mechanism that
achieves individual rationality, efficiency, and budget balance at once, regardless if
incentive compatibility is fulfilled or not [8].2 However, incentive compatibility is the
prerequisite for an efficient outcome. Hence, the named characteristics need to be
balanced. Efficient mechanisms can lead to a considerable need to plough in money,
as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms give proof of [e.g., 9]. Likewise,
individually rational and budget balanced mechanisms can result in highly inefficient
outcomes [10]. Additionally, budget balance and individual rationality are required to
enable sustainability and implementability over time [11].
In this work, we evaluate three suitable mechanisms for bilateral negotiations on
multiple attributes with respect to their economic properties. Two are stylized representations of existing mechanisms, one – DISCOUNTBIDDING – is newly introduced in
this article. We maintain the requirements of individual rationality and budget balance, abandon incentive compatibility, and study the effect of strategic bidding on
efficiency and distribution of economic surplus in different settings. Following, we
define the market scenario in more detail and review related work. We then formalize
the negotiation mechanisms, analyze strategic behavior and outcomes, and compare
the mechanisms in settings under complete and incomplete information with different
levels of risk and risk aversion. In the last section, we summarize the results, sketch
the limitations, and outline future work.
2

The result is derived in Theorem 1 of [8]. Their Theorem 2, provides the grounds for testing
whether a given incentive-compatible, individually rational mechanism maximizes the expected economic surplus. This does, however, not apply to the present scenario, as its robustness depends on knowledge of both distributions of player types, it is restricted to single-attribute negotiations and a trusted third party is required.
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2

Scenario & Related Work

In order to evaluate the performance of different negotiation mechanisms, we consult
a market scenario that is typical for custom services such as Cloud services: Multiple
consumers are interested to procure a service of a particular functionality. Price and
quality attributes play a major role. The consumers are endowed with heterogeneous
preferences; their individual willingness to pay subject to a certain quality level is not
fully known to the public.
Multiple providers are present in the market. They offer one or more custom services that fit the functional requirements of the consumer, yet differ in their quality of
service and price. A key assumption is that providers have different technologies and
internal processes and, thus, different costs for service provision. Or they serve as so
called service supply hubs, forming a single interface to the customer and using multiple service suppliers in the backend [12]. These factors and associate costs to the
service provider are not fully known to the consumers.
Consumers and providers interact bilaterally. There is no third party running a central exchange. All parties act rationally and strategically in their own interest. Since
consumers’ and providers’ types are not publicly known, the market exhibits uncertainty of the optimal matching. To facilitate online scenarios with low transactions
costs, interaction is restricted to two-stage mechanisms, in preference to more complicated negotiation mechanisms. This simplification follows the standard assumption in
bargaining models that delay of reaching an agreement is costly and, thus, rational
agents should reach an agreement immediately with their first offers (cf. the seminal
paper by [13] and the literature building on it). It remains future work to extend the
analysis to more complex, iterative mechanisms.
Academia suggests several market mechanisms to be used in such a scenario. The
simplest and most widely used mechanism is a fixed price for a specifically defined
service without any further information exchange. Such a fixed price can either be set
by the provider or the consumer. In both cases, the bidding language is very simple,
yet very little information is transferred hindering the discovery of the optimal service
specification given the provider’s and consumer’s types. In game theoretic terms,
such a fixed price offer is an ultimatum game, the simplest form of a negotiation
mechanism. A subtle variation commonly observed in practice is to not offer a single
quality-price combination, but a small set of such combinations to choose from. This
increases the likelihood of discovering the optimal service specification at the cost of
complexity of decision making for both sides.
More complex mechanisms to tackle the multi-dimensionality are multi-attribute
negotiations and auctions. They allow for the negotiation on non-price attributes [e.g.,
14]. Many examples for electronic markets that can handle the complex sale or procurement of multi-attribute services and products through automated negotiation exist
[15-17]. Such mechanisms’ bidding languages are rich – a lot of information is exchanged. Multi-attribute auctions based on the family of VCG mechanism are incentive compatible and efficient, yet they suffer from the impossibility to balance the
budget. Approaches to achieve budget balance by foregoing efficiency mostly result
in highly complex mechanisms, either with respect to their accomplishment or, due to
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complex transfer functions, with respect to the strategies. For instance, [2] introduces
an iterative protocol while [11] proposes budget balanced approximations of VCG
mechanisms, at the cost of sophisticated transfer functions which lead to complex
strategy considerations.
In summary, common mechanisms in the scenario sketched above either reveal
very little information, or their bidding language and/or transfer function is complex.
The information exchanged is oftentimes biased by strategic behavior of the participants. This circumstance suggests that there is a trade-off between the simplicity of a
mechanism and the information content exchanged between the negotiating parties.
Moreover, strategic misrepresentation of preferences can be observed due to the mixture of integrative and distributive parts of the negotiations.
We seek a mechanism that fulfills individual rationality and budget balance and, at
the same time, keeps efficiency as well as truthful information content high, while
maintaining a simple bidding language. In order to evaluate how different mechanisms perform in the present setting, we scrutinize the following three mechanisms:
1. TUPLEBIDDING: One party poses a fixed price offer, i.e. a single pricequality tuple. The other party either accepts or not.
2. SCORINGBIDDING: One party proposes a complete scoring function over the
set of possible price-quality combinations. The other party either selects one
tuple described by this function or rejects to agree at all.
3. DISCOUNTBIDDING: Like SCORINGBIDDING, but in addition to the scoring
function, the proposing party requests a price discount it requires on any tuple described by the scoring function.
TUPLEBIDDING and SCORINGBIDDING represent extreme cases on the continuum of
simple and rich information exchange. They are stylized representations of commonly
used fixed price and multi-attribute mechanisms. Intermediate versions like proposing
multiple price-quality tuples and extensions like repeated offer exchanges are possible
but offer only limited insight in qualitative differences of the mechanisms’ mechanics.
DISCOUNTBIDDING is newly introduced as an extension of SCORINGBIDDING. The
basic idea is to separate the integrative and distributive element of the negotiation
with the scoring function allowing to identify the optimal price-quality combination
and the discount factor allowing to claim value. All three mechanisms are formally
characterized and evaluated in the following.

3

Formalization and Evaluation of Negotiation Mechanisms

In this section, we first formalize the model of preferences and the negotiation mechanisms. We then evaluate the mechanisms under complete information, i.e. the provider and the consumer knowing each other’s types. While this setting is rather hypothetical, it serves as benchmark for the more realistic case of incomplete information.
An evaluation of the mechanisms under incomplete information with different degrees of risk and risk aversion will provide a thorough understanding. A comparison
of all mechanisms concludes this section and discusses which mechanism will prevail
depending on who decides on the mechanism.
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3.1

Model of Preferences and Key Assumptions

Consider two parties, service provider P and consumer C , both being individually
rational and maximizing their utility. P and C negotiate over quality q and
price p of a service. Quality q may be an aggregated abstraction of various quality
attributes of interest to C [cf. 12]. Following standard micro-economic theory [e.g.,
18] we assume that the consumer C has decreasing marginal returns from increasing
quality, i.e. a concave scoring function. Analogously, we assume that the provider P
has a production technology which yields decreasing marginal returns. An example:
This assumption asserts that a provider who guarantees availability of a Cloud service
requires more resources to increase availability from 98% to 99% than he needs to
increase it from 94% to 95%. Adding the assumption of approximately linear costs of
resources, this yields a convex cost function, which is again typical in microeconomic modeling [e.g., 18].
Operationalization of the assumptions: Both quality and price are individually
normalized to the unit interval: q  (0,1) , p  (0,1) . This simplification allows for more
comprehensible analytical considerations without significantly limiting interpretability of results. The provider’s cost function and the consumer’s scoring function are
both modeled as monomials for three reasons: (1) It is a common approach in the
related literature to capture each quality-attribute with one monomial [e.g., 1, 19]. (2)
It allows for both simple and comprehensible analytical considerations along with
computational tractability and (3) it ensures proximity to realistic scenarios under
consideration of the preference elicitation challenges. In effect, we assume the provider P has a cost function C  q   q b with b  [1,  ) representing the cost of providing a service of given quality. b  1 yields a linear, b  1 a convex cost function with
positive and increasing marginal costs of quality. The provider P has the quasi-linear
utility function U P  q   p  C  q  . For consumer C we assume the scoring function S  q   q a with a  (0, b) . a  0 ensures strong monotonicity in quality, i.e. C prefers a higher quality over a lower quality, and a  b ensures the existence of a mutually beneficial agreement. In practice and for a given provider and consumer it might be
the case that no mutually beneficial agreement on a q-p-tuple exists. However, in this
case no mechanism could yield an individually rational agreement. We omit this case
and assume the existence of a mutually beneficial agreement for comparing the ability
of different negotiation mechanisms in identifying the optimal agreement.
Under incomplete information, we allow for the consumer being risk neutral or risk
averse. To capture C ’s risk preferences, we employ – analogous to the provider – a
quasi-linear utility function additionally wrapped by a term that introduces constant
1

relative risk aversion [e.g., 20]. C ’s utility function becomes U C  q    S  q   p 1r ;
r  0 implies C being risk-neutral, while an increasing r  0 implies C being increasingly risk averse.
The economic surplus – also termed welfare – generated by an agreement is defined as sum of utilities W  q  U C (q)  U P  q  . For a risk neutral consumer or for complete information, this simplifies to W  q   q a  qb , i.e. welfare is determined by the
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quality that the two negotiating parties agree on. The price is merely the mechanism
for distributing welfare.3
The optimal quality q * maximizing welfare is
1

a

b

 b  a b
 b  ab  b  ab
q  argmax W (q )      0,1
w*      
q
a
 
a
a
with
*

(1)

Fig. 1 sketches an example of the above model with a  0.5 , b  2 and resulting
q *  0.397 . The price is arbitrarily chosen as p  0.35  [C  q*  , S  q* ] and both parties’
utilities are positive.
1
Consumer Scoring Function (a=0.5)
Provider Cost Function (b=2.0)
Negotiated Agreement

S(q),c(q)

0.8
0.6

UC

0.4

UP

0.2
0
0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

q

Fig. 1. Example for scoring and cost functions, optimal quality, price and utilities

Graphically, the assumptions on C (q ) and S (q ) assure the existence of an area of
individually rational potential agreements in between the two curves. The objective of
a negotiation is to determine a point {q, p} within this area. It is in both parties’ interest and Pareto optimal to choose q  q* . This maximizes welfare. The price p anywhere on the intersection of q* with the area distributes this welfare. For an omniscient arbitrator with given fairness perception, this is relatively easy. For P and C
under incomplete information and strategic behavior, this is, however, very complex.
3.2

Negotiation Mechanisms

Three negotiation mechanisms can help P and C in their complex task. Without loss
of generality, we assume the consumer C going first and the provider P responding
to the offer. As the scenario and model are symmetric with respect to the roles, the
evaluation with an inverted order of action follows analogously.
TUPLEBIDDING: C submits a binding bid {q, p} . P can accept this tuple as
agreement or reject it leading to no agreement. Assuming myopic utility maximization within the negotiation, P accepts if p  C ( q ) and rejects otherwise. For brevity
of the analysis, we assume acceptance in case of indifference.
3

In order to compare welfare across levels of risk aversion and in order not to overvalue the
utility of C , we adapt the welfare function in case of r  0 by back-transforming U C  q  .
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SCORINGBIDDING: C submits a binding bid of a scoring function Sˆ (q ) or (in a
less generic setting) the parameters of a scoring function, e.g., â for Sˆ  q   q aˆ . C can
(and will) choose Sˆ  q   S (q) , i.e. she can strategically misrepresent her type. P sets
q pˆ } is the agreement. If there exists a q̂ with
a quality q̂ and price p̂  Sˆ (qˆ ) . {ˆ,
ˆ , P maximizes his utility with pˆ  Sˆ  qˆ  and qˆ  argmax Sˆ  q   C (q ) . OthSˆ  qˆ   C(q)
q

erwise, P rejects any agreement.
DISCOUNTBIDDING: C submits a binding bid of a scoring function Ŝ  q  or a single parameter, e.g., â . In addition, C submits a discount value d . P sets a quality q̂
q pˆ } is the agreement. If there exists a q̂ with Sˆ  qˆ   d  C(q̂) ,
and price pˆ  Sˆ  qˆ   d . {ˆ,
P maximizes his utility with pˆ  Sˆ  qˆ   d and qˆ  argmax Sˆ  q   d  C (q ) . Otherwise,
q

P rejects any agreement.

3.3

Evaluation

For the case of complete information, we derive optimal bidding behavior, utility, and
welfare for both C and P analytically. With complete information, C knows P ’s
cost function C (q) and profit maximizing decision function. Analytically, one can
derive the following equilibria: In either of the three mechanisms, provider P will be
left with a utility of zero. Consumer C can claim the entire maximum possible surplus
in both TUPLEBIDDING and DISCOUNTBIDDING, yielding a utility
a

b

 b  a b  b  a b
U C        w * . SCORINGBIDDING is sub-optimal from both welfare and cona
a


a

1
e

sumer’s perspective, with U C  e b   w * .4
Let us consider the more realistic case of incomplete information and risk aversion.
Incomplete information implies risk in the decision making of C . C continues being
perfectly informed with one exception: the provider’s cost function, here operationalized as parameter b . C only knows that b is uniformly distributed: b  U  m  s, m  s 
with m and s being public knowledge. s is a proxy for C ’s risk; the higher s , the
higher the risk. P still knows b , i.e. his cost function. The case of complete information could be solved analytically; for incomplete information, we choose a numerical analysis with a wide range of parameters a , b , s , r as input to the simulation in
order to test for sensitivities and assure robustness of the results. For brevity and simplicity, the following presentation focuses on a limited set of parameters ( a  0.5 ,
5
b  2 , r  1 , s   0,1 ).
Three reasons make us believe that the numerical solution is accurate: (1) For the
border case of complete information, the numerical and the analytical solution coin4
5

Proofs can be obtained from the authors upon request.
A wider range of results is available from the authors upon request.
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cide; (2) all strategic effects and utility comparisons vary either smoothly within the
parameter range or, in case of step functions, are straightforward to explain; (3) the
qualitative effects hold true for all parameter configurations tested.
TupleBidding.Obviously, C ’s bid consisting of q and p has two effects: It determines the likelihood of reaching an agreement and the utility of an agreement,
should it be achieved. In bidding, C trades-off these two directly opposed effects for
maximizing her expected utility. In the border case of complete information ( s  0 ),
bidding is straightforward and the numerical simulation coincides with the analytical
solution presented above. Any q, p -tuple belongs to either of two sets: Either it
leads to agreement with certainty or to disagreement with certainty. Among the tuples
that lead to an agreement, C maximizes her utility by choosing the efficient allocation.
When introducing risk ( s  0 ), C ’s optimization problem becomes more tricky.
For increasing s , C initially prefers bidding more conservatively, i.e. she foregoes
utility from the agreement but assures reaching agreement with 100% certainty. She
does so by simultaneously lowering q and increasing p (both to her disadvantage in
case of agreement), i.e. by moving the bid to the upper left in Fig. 2. At one point –
called “tipping point” t from here on –, s becomes excessive from C ’s viewpoint. C
stops retracting and starts bidding more aggressive. From s  t onwards, C simultaneously increases q and decreases p ; she demands higher utility in case of agreement and takes the risk of not reaching an agreement.
Under complete information ( s  0 ), the efficient agreement is reached, C claims
all the value, and P has a utility of zero. Welfare, i.e. the sum of utilities, is at its
maximum. With increasing risk s  0 , C ’s utility decreases monotonically and increasingly rapidly – up to the tipping point (Fig. a). At the tipping point, C changes
her strategy (see above): The monotonic decline of expected utility persists, but is
slowed down. As C ’s risk increases, P ’s utility increases – again, up to the tipping
point, when P ’s expected utility reaches its maximum and then sharply declines with
further increasing risk (Fig. b). The effect on welfare is straightforward: Welfare is
optimal for s  0 . With risk, the parties on average no longer agree on the efficient
allocation; welfare declines gradually. With risk s beyond the tipping point t , when
P ’s utility declines, the decline of welfare increases its speed (Fig. c).
ScoringBidding. C faces the same trade-off as with price-quality tuples: utility in
case of agreement vs. the likelihood of reaching agreement. C ’s strategy in bidding a
scoring function follows the same pattern as in bidding a price-quality tuple: With
increasing risk ( s ), the consumer bids more conservatively. Technically, he decreases
â and bids more truthfully. He does so sufficiently to assure certainty of reaching an
agreement. Again, this holds up to the tipping point t , at which C starts gambling,
i.e. she gradually increases â for claiming more value at the risk of not reaching
agreement. With increasing risk aversion, the cost of gambling rises and, thus, the
tipping point rises. Interestingly, the tipping point coincides with the tipping point for
bidding price-quality tuples for any r . C ’s and P ’s expected utility as well as welfare all three qualitatively resemble the patterns from TUPLEBIDDING for varying s
and r .
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C ’s expected utility is maximal for s  0 and decreases monotonically for increasing s (Fig. a). The decrease speeds up for increasing s up to the tipping point and
slows down from t  s onwards. P ’s expected utility is zero for s  0 , increases
monotonically for increasing s up to the tipping point. It sharply kinks at s  t and
decreases thereafter (Fig. b).
0.5

Interestingly, welfare is optimal for s  t .
Strategic bidding by C hinders the integrative part of the negotiation. Risk initially
lowers C ’s strategic misrepresentation and
thereby allows P to come closer to the
efficient quality. At s  0 , C submits a bid
of â as close as possible to b , optimizing
her own utility, yet sacrificing efficiency by
(a) Expected Utility of C
overbidding by almost four times the real
value a (for a  0.5 and b  2.0 ). As before, with increasing risk ( s  0 ), C will
lower her bid, thus increasing efficiency
simultaneously. After passing the utmost
efficient point for s  t , C starts gambling
by raising â and welfare starts to rapidly
decline again (Fig. c).
DiscountBidding. C ’s trade-off is the
same as for the other mechanisms, only the
vehicle of bidding more or less conservatively differs. It can be implemented by
(b) Expected Utility of P
either lowering â , or by lowering d , or
both. The interesting question is which of
these vehicles C chooses to maximize her
expected utility.
Analogously to the analytical results in
case of complete information, bidding the
scoring function truthfully ( â  a ) and
claiming value via d is the strategy maximizing C ’s expected utility. For the functional forms of C  q  and S  q  being
(c) Expected Welfare
strongly convex/concave, bidding the scoring function truthfully is the only optimum.
Fig. 2. Comparison of negotiation mechaConsidering, for instance, the border case
nisms with respect to utility and welfare
of s  0 : C knows the efficient allocation
a d } to meet that very allocation.
that maximizes her utility and needs to derive a bid {ˆ,
With â  a , the provider’s optimization will yield a sub-optimal quality; value is lost
and cannot be regained by any d . Numerical results show that the same holds true
under risk. For more general scoring and bidding functions, however, bidding the
scoring function truthfully might not be the only optimum – it is, however, always
DiscountBidding
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0.45

Uc (Expected)

0.4

0.35

0.3

0.25

0.2

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

s

0.25

DiscountBidding
ScoringBidding
TupleBidding

Up (Expected)

0.2

0.15

0.1

0.05

0

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

s

0.5

DiscountBidding
ScoringBidding
TupleBidding

0.48

Welfare (Expected)

0.46

0.44

0.42

0.4

0.38

0.36

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

s

144

one optimum, as long as P chooses the efficient quality q for a truthful bid. Again,
the qualitative patterns in strategies and utilities resemble what is known from the
other mechanisms: With increasing s , C initially bids more and more conservative,
lowering d . The tipping point t exists at which this pattern inverts and C switches to
gambling, i.e. to increasing d . Up to t , C ’s utility decreases in s and P ’s utility
increases. For increasing s  t , the decline of C ’s utility slows down (Fig. a) and P ’s
utility decreases as well (Fig. b). Welfare decreases in s with a kink at t (Fig. c).
Increasing risk aversion r increases t but does not qualitatively affect behavior or
outcomes. All variation in C ’s bidding depending on s and r takes place in the discount d ; the revelation of the scoring function remains truthful ( â  a ).
In summary, discount bidding effectively disentangles the integrative and distributive elements of the negotiation. Bidding the scoring function truthfully allows maximizing the consumer’s expected utility and expected welfare in any given state of the
world, i.e. for any combination of provider cost function (parameter b ), consumer
scoring function (parameter a ), and consumer risk aversion (parameter r ). A comparison of DISCOUNTBIDDING and SCORINGBIDDING shows that this truthfulness is
only possible, as the discount factor d provides the consumer a vehicle to claim value, i.e. d is the distributive element of the negotiation. Truthfulness in the scoring
function is an interesting and potentially beneficial property of the discount bidding
mechanism. The even more interesting question is, however, how the three mechanisms compare in terms of utility for one or the other party, as this will drive adoption
in the marketplace. The following section presents this comparison.
3.4

Implication for Adoption of Negotiation Mechanisms

This section provides a comparison of the three mechanisms regarding utility and
welfare and discusses which mechanism will prevail depending on who decides on
the mechanism. With complete information TUPLEBIDDING allows the consumer to
choose the efficient allocation q * while claiming the entire surplus by setting the
price to the value of P ’s cost function. The same is possible when
DISCOUNTBIDDING is implemented, as C can use the discount d to obtain the entire
surplus, while ensuring efficiency by truthfully bidding â . Thus, under complete
information, both mechanisms result in the same allocation, utility and welfare.
Intuitively, SCORINGBIDDING cannot achieve the same efficiency, as C is always
tempted to misrepresent her type by overbidding â , thus leading to a quality other
than q * . Despite the fact that it yields the same utility for P , it turns out that
SCORINGBIDDING leads to a lower utility for C , which also implies a lower welfare
than when using TUPLEBIDDING or DISCOUNTBIDDING as negotiation mechanism.
With incomplete information, Fig. a shows that for any given risk s , the consumer’s expected utility is equal for DISCOUNTBIDDING and TUPLEBIDDING (the lines are
exactly on top of each other) and strictly lower for SCORINGBIDDING. This result is
independent of the consumer’s risk aversion. The implication is twofold: (1) When
the consumer can choose the mechanism, she will prefer either DISCOUNTBIDDING or
TUPLEBIDDING over SCORINGBIDDING. The consumer may have the ability to choose
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the mechanism when either there are multiple providers offering different mechanisms, or when she has sufficient purchasing power to dictate the mechanism. (2)
When the consumer has the chance to reduce her risk at a reasonable cost in terms of
time and money, she will do so. She may have the chance to acquire information either by standard market research, or by learning from repeated negotiations with a
single or with multiple providers.
From the provider’s view, there is a clear ranking of the three mechanisms
(Fig. b): SCORINGBIDDING is preferred over DISCOUNTBIDDING which is preferred
over TUPLEBIDDING. This holds for all s  0 ; for s  0 , the provider is indifferent
between the three mechanisms. The implication is, again, twofold: (1) When the provider chooses the mechanism, he will choose SCORINGBIDDING. (2) When the provider can influence the consumer’s risk, he will do so. He will try to provoke conservative bidding by the consumer but will not exaggerate the risk to a level where the
consumer starts gambling and the provider risks not reaching an agreement at all. The
provider can, e.g., influence risk by withholding information on the exact technology
employed and on his costs. Both are common in real-world settings. The provider has,
however, an interest on providing some information on technology and, thus, on implied costs. Again, this is a common behavior in real-world settings. The ranking of
mechanisms from the provider’s viewpoint is independent of the consumer’s risk
aversion. The provider’s strategic manipulation of the consumer’s risk, e.g., by
providing or withholding information on the technology and associated costs, depends
on the consumer’s risk aversion. This, in turn creates risk on the provider side with
regard to the exact degree of the consumer’s risk aversion. The analysis of equilibria
in this extended game is beyond the scope of this paper.
The welfare perspective combines the above perspectives and, again, provides a
ranking of mechanisms. Interestingly, for the case of the consumer being risk averse,
this ranking depends on the level of risk (Fig. c). For low risk, welfare from
TUPLEBIDDING is higher than from SCORINGBIDDING. For high risk and risk aversion,
this ranking inverts. In any case, DISCOUNTBIDDING results in at least the same welfare for the special case of s  0 and strictly higher expected welfare for the general
case of s  0 . This result leads to the following implication: When a third party can
choose the mechanism and intends to maximize welfare, it will select
DISCOUNTBIDDING, independent of risk and risk aversion. Note, however, that in the
scenario studied in this paper, it is rather unlikely that a third party like a regulator
imposes a mechanism to the bilateral negotiation.
Looking beyond the scope of a single negotiation, two observations stand out:
Firstly, the provider will strategically manipulate the consumer’s risk prior to the
negotiation, if he has the chance of doing so (which will hold true in most real-world
settings). His challenge is to find the optimal degree of risk, as neither a low nor a
high risk by the consumer is optimal for the provider. Secondly, DISCOUNTBIDDING is
an attractive mechanism, but far from certain to be adopted in practice. In the extended game of selecting a mechanism, TUPLEBIDDING is not Pareto-optimal, it is dominated by DISCOUNTBIDDING. DISCOUNTBIDDING will prevail when either the consumer or a third party have the discretion or power to impose a mechanism. Bidding
scoring functions will be adopted when the provider decides on the mechanism.

146

A positive side effect exists that might increase the provider’s utility from
DISCOUNTBIDDING in the long term: DISCOUNTBIDDING promotes truthful revelation
of the consumer’s scoring function and, thereby, allows the provider to optimize his
technology portfolio and cost structure in the long-term. This effect – that is not reflected in the provider’s utility function in this paper – might lead to all parties unanimously preferring discount bidding over the other mechanisms.

4

Conclusion & Future Work

This paper is set in the scenario of IT-based individualized services that require
matching of functional requirements and in addition the negotiation of non-functional
aspects. Specifically, we studied bilateral negotiations on quality and price of a service between the service provider and the consumer. In this setting, a negotiation has
an integrative facet – many possible qualities of service are sub-optimal, but by means
of communication within the negotiation mechanism, the parties can identify a Pareto-optimal quality of service. On the other hand, the negotiation has a distributive
facet – either party has an interest in claiming as large a share in the value from an
agreement as possible. Strategic bidding typically leads to negotiators mixing the
integrative and distributive facets which results in inefficient outcomes.
In such a scenario, the selection of an “optimal” or at least “satisfying” negotiation
mechanism is a challenge. In the light of mechanism design theory [8], we postulated
individual rationality and budget balance for analyzing economic properties of different negotiation mechanisms, namely in how far agents’ negotiation strategies deviate
from truthful revelation of their types and in how far efficiency of negotiated agreements deviates from the efficient agreement an omniscient arbitrator would define.
On this theoretical background, we compared three negotiation mechanisms:
TUPLEBIDDING, SCORINGBIDDING and DISCOUNTBIDDING. TUPLEBIDDING serves as a
proxy for commonly used fixed price mechanisms; SCORINGBIDDING resembles the
widely used approach of agents bidding a scoring function, e.g., in multi-attribute
auctions. DISCOUNTBIDDING was newly introduced in this paper – it allows bidding a
scoring function and additionally a discount that the consumer demands from the
provider. The intuition is that this approach disentangles the integrative and distributive facets of the negotiation and increases efficiency. Our results confirmed this intuition: For complete information, we derived these results analytically from the game
theoretic equilibrium; for the extended case of incomplete information, risk and risk
aversion, we used a numerical simulation to characterize the mechanisms.
TUPLEBIDDING is not Pareto-optimal but dominated by DISCOUNTBIDDING. Thus,
it is unlikely to prevail in a marketplace for custom services as soon as this market
matures. Nowadays, comparable mechanisms are used by some Cloud service providers, for example. It has the advantage of a simple bidding language and very little
communication effort. However, as providers and consumers get more sophisticated
and as automated negotiations become more prevalent, the disadvantageous economic
properties will weigh heavier and TUPLEBIDDING might become less relevant.
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SCORINGBIDDING emphasizes the integrative facet and yields higher expected utility for the provider than either of the other mechanisms. When the provider can dictate
the choice of the mechanism, he will presumably favor SCORINGBIDDING. However,
the consumer’s strategic misrepresentation of her scoring function leads to suboptimal agreements. DISCOUNTBIDDING captures even more of the integrative facet: it
promotes truthful revelation of the consumer’s scoring function and thereby allows
reaching an efficient agreement more often than with SCORINGBIDDING. The expected
welfare from DISCOUNTBIDDING is higher than from SCORINGBIDDING for any level
of risk and risk aversion. Compared to SCORINGBIDDING, the discount factor in
DISCOUNTBIDDING shifts utility from the provider to the consumer. Whenever the
consumer or an independent third party can dictate the negotiation mechanism, she
will tend to favor DISCOUNTBIDDING. A positive long-term effect of
DISCOUNTBIDDING is that truthful revelation of the consumer’s scoring function allows the provider to adapt his technology and service offering. In the long run, this
may even overturn the provider’s favoritism for SCORINGBIDDING.
All mechanisms show a tipping point in the consumer’s behavior depending on the
risk: with risk below this tipping point, the consumer bids conservatively and assures
reaching an agreement; beyond this risk, she bids aggressively and risks not reaching
an agreement. For a given level of risk aversion, this tipping point is – somewhat
surprisingly – identical for all three mechanisms.
In each mechanism, the provider has an incentive to strategically manipulate the
consumer’s risk via the information provided on his technology and costs. Neither full
transparency nor opacity are optimal for the provider; he will have to carefully chose
the level of information depending on the consumer’s risk aversion. The higher the
consumer’s risk aversion, the less information will be given by the provider. All results hold inversely when inverting the roles of consumer and provider.
The presented work has four main limitations: (1) We assume individually rational
utility maximizing agents. (2) The results depend on the model of preferences, especially on the functional forms of cost, scoring, and utility functions. While we believe
that similar results can be obtained for other preferences, this has not been proven yet.
(3) We study “only” three distinct mechanisms without deriving an “optimal mechanism” in the mechanism design sense. However, given the complexity and impossibility theorems, we believe this comparison of existing mechanisms and introduction of
DISCOUNTBIDDING as additional mechanism is a valuable contribution to the field. (4)
All three mechanisms only allow for a single offer and its acceptance or rejection by
the counterparty. More complex negotiation mechanisms with an alternating offer
exchange are possible, so is the introduction of a central marketplace.
Future work will address these limitations and, for instance, study other formalizations of preferences, behavior by human agents, more complex negotiation mechanisms, and the comparison of bilateral mechanisms with a centralized exchange.
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